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ABSTRACT 
The issue of audit tenure has been discussed since four decades age. Nowadays, 
due to the recent corporate scandals in United States, the issue is discussed 
together with auditor independence that led to companies’ demise. Mandatory 
audit rotation debates come from the arguments that long audit tenure would 
create costly relationship between auditors and clients and thus would lead to 
audit failure such as in the case of bankruptcy. Therefore, this study attempts to 
investigate the situation in Malaysia whereby no empirical study using archival 
data has been done. Specifically, the current study examines the impact of audit 
tenure on the issuance of going concern opinion. 
The result shows that the variable of audit tenure is positively significant in 
determining going concern opinion. Our findings also pointed that if a client 
never changed its auditor since listing, there is a tendency to issue a clean 
opinion though the client suffers apparent financial problems. Therefore, it can 
be said that, “auditor change would do well, but forcing an unrealistic auditor 
rotation might not yield what it hopes for”. For the benefit of auditing 
profession, we echo the importance of self-regulation and Laissez-faire practice 
in Malaysia as a better alternative than a mandatory auditor rotation. Besides, 
the results show no significant impact of Big five audit firms and independence 
of audit committee on auditor going concern opinion. Further sensitivity 
analyses show that the results are robust to different measurements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of auditor tenure on the issuance of 
going concern opinion in public listed companies (PLCs) on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
In addition, we examine the independence of audit committee and Big Five firms on the issuance 
of going concern opinion in the light of the new International Standard of Auditing 570 Going 
Concern (ISA 570). Prior to 1998, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) did not adopt the 
IAG 23 on assessment of going concern assumption. Later, in 1998, the MIA adopted ISA 570 
Going Concern by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) which was then revised in 
2000 and became operative from January 2002. Among significant changes between IAG 23 
and ISA 570 include provision to assess going concern assumption in every audit engagement and 
additional prescription to guide practitioners in detecting going concern problem.  
Since the auditor is an agent to the shareholders in monitoring managers’ duties to create 
wealth for the principals (shareholders), auditor’s failure to inform shareholders on the going 
concern of the principal’s business is a serious matter. With the introduction of the US Sarbanes 
Oxley, auditor’s relationship with client is now being regulated to at least of the engagement audit 
partner’s tenure. The length of tenure of an audit firm maintains a client has long been an issue in 
the United States and other countries (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Shockley, 1981; Arrunada and 
Paz-Ares, 1997; and Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). Such long-term relationships could, in 
reality or be perceived to make the audit firms too committed or beholden to the companies, 
thereby undermining its independence, compromising its objectivity, and reducing its 
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effectiveness (The Star, 2002). Several countries in European Union such as Italy and Spain have 
required the audit firms to rotate by a certain time (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). However, 
even in such a mandatory audit rotation regime, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that audit 
quality is improved by this means. As evidence, the latest scandal involves a company namely 
Parmalat in Italy complied with a law that requires companies to change their auditors every nine 
years. The discovery of losses amounting to RM41.8 billion in Parmalat has provoked outrage 
across continent of Europe and proves that the law of auditor rotation still does not help to 
improve audit quality (The News Straits Times, Dec. 27, 2003).  
 
In the past few years, auditors had been blamed due to the role of themselves in the mega 
corporate scandals such as Enron Incorporation, WorldCom Incorporation, Global Crossing, 
ImClone Systems Incorporation and Tyco International. Such criticism had raised lots of 
questions regarding auditors’ independence. Besides, such criticism was levelled against auditors 
because they audit their clients for a long time and subsequently concentrated more on non-audit 
services rather than audit. For example in the case of Enron, Andersen was the auditor since 
Enron was set up until collapsed. For that reason, there have been calls for sweeping changes in 
the auditing profession to ensure independence and therefore improve their audit quality (The 
Star, Aug 12, 2002).  
 
It is often argued that mandatory audit rotation is one of the solutions to solve auditor’s 
cozy relationship with their clients. Auditor rotation supporters argue that its benefits stem from 
greater audit independence, which in turn improves audit quality. However, the cost of imposing 
mandatory audit rotation would lead to higher start-up cost, impedes learning curve as well as the 
failures to attract new-blood to the accounting profession and lower investment from the audit 
firms to enhance knowledge and expertise in certain industries (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). And 
in the case of Malaysia where foreign direct investment is still a major economic contributor, the 
country looks less attractive than its neighbouring counterparts (where there is no mandatory 
rotation except for Singapore which mandate audit partner rotation for PLC) since the 
appointment of auditors is usually of company affairs and not of regulators as stated under 
Section 9 (6) the Malaysian Companies Act 1965.  
 
In ASEAN, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has requisitioned all banks 
incorporated in Singapore to change their audit firms every five years under a new ruling. The 
new audit requirement is one of a series of control measures on corporate governance introduced 
by the Singapore authorities (The Star, March 14, 2002). According to Ravi Menon, executive 
director of the authority’s supervisory policy and banking departments, the mandatory audit firm 
rotation would help prevent audit firms from having excessive focus on maintaining long-term 
commercial relationships with the banks they audit. However, in Malaysia there is no regulation 
binding the banks or the companies to change the audit firms within a certain period.  
 
II. THE MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY  
 
The most important motivation to carry out this study is lack of consensus among the 
public, regulators and audit firms on the issue of mandatory audit firm rotation. Teoh and Lim 
(1996) found that in Malaysia, the public perceived auditor would improve auditor   
independence. However, recently, Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) suggested a more 
lenient way to regulate auditor independence. This calls for a mandatory rotation of the audit 
partners responsible for the audit of listed companies after a period of not more than seven years. 
Furthermore, the audit partner rotating after such period should not resume the role of audit 
engagement partner for the audit client until two years have elapsed. Prior to this pronouncement, 
in 1999, the MIA under its former president, Datuk Hanifah Noordin, called for a mandatory 
rotation of external auditors in every three or five years (New Straits Times, March 26, 1999).     .  
 
Following the corporate scandals in the United States, the regulators in Malaysia such as 
the Malaysia Securities Commission (SC) and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
became more concerned with the mandatory rotation of the audit firms. In view of the importance 
of the issue in question, the MIA and the Malaysia Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
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(MICPA), which are the accounting bodies in Malaysia agreed to establish an MIA/MACPA joint 
Taskforce on Auditor Independence in May 2002. Both institutes agreed that the overall 
disadvantages of mandatory rotation of audit firms, including exorbitant costs, disruption and loss 
of accumulative knowledge, and a restriction on the freedom of companies to choose their own 
auditors, outweigh the benefits that may be derived from such rotation of audit firms (the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 2002). Therefore this study tries to prove that whether these 
suggestions can be use in the current situation in Malaysia. The regulators must emphasize the 
impact of auditor tenure to the audit quality especially if there is a negative relationship between 
auditor tenure and audit quality. If this happens, it can be said that long time auditors are deemed 
to impair their independence when auditing their clients.  
 
In addition, no empirical studies have been carried out in Malaysia regarding auditor 
tenure and audit quality. This study examines the local setting namely Malaysian companies listed 
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (Main Board and Second Board). Hopefully, this study will   
give new understanding on the auditing profession in Malaysia. The results from this study will 
be useful for the regulators in improving the independence of the auditor. Finally, the results can 
be used by the companies to improve both the effectiveness and efficiency of the audit that they 
undertake besides their relationship with the auditors in gaining the public trust.  
 
Auditor quality has been concerned in recent times due to several mega               
corporate scandals in the United States and lately in Europe. For that reason our study    
contributes to the body of knowledge on current situations of audit quality by examining the 
financially distressed companies in Malaysia. Besides, we introduce a new variable which is the 
auditor change variable. This study would then serves as a feedback to the regulators regarding 
the mandatory rotation and the auditors’ independence in Malaysia.  
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
This section highlights several studies that utilized auditor tenure as a variable and its 
effect to the audit quality. Deis and Giroux (1992) found that the audit quality decreases as 
auditor tenure increase. The reason they gave was that the auditors become less challenged and 
therefore less likely to use innovative audit procedures and finally fail to maintain their 
competency. 
  
Similarly, Stice (1991) found the relationship between auditor tenure and a lawsuit 
against the auditor. In the study, he found that auditor tenure was shorter for those audit 
engagements that resulted in a lawsuit against the auditor in the case of control sample that 
matched only on time period. However, the same is not true when compared to an industry pair-
matched control sample.  
 
De Angelo (1981a) also mentioned that the quality of auditors divided to two parts. First 
is to detect anything misleading in financial statements of the client and secondly is to report the 
misleading. The first quality is regarding the competence and skills of the auditors to detect any 
fraud while the second one is regarding the auditors’ independence. In the case of long time 
auditor, it is argued that the auditor’s independence will be reduced due to the fact that the auditor 
feels comfortable with the clients whether in term of revenue and also their expertise on the 
clients’ system. Subsequently they will not report any misleading information to ensure there is 
no any change of auditors. In that case, an unqualified report (clean report) will be issued.  
 
In the point of view of regulators, long association between a corporation and an 
accounting firm may lead to impairing their independence (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). The 
United States regulators emphasised on this since 1976 under the Metcalf Committee report (the 
U.S. Senate, 1976) which suggested that mandatory auditor rotation as a way for the accounting 
profession to bolster their independence from clients. However, this was only a suggestion. 
Perhaps the current act, which has been enacted in the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) 
will remedy this. Under this act, auditor independence is regulated through audit partner rotation 
but not for the case of audit firm as the whole. The lead audit or co-ordinating partner and the 
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reviewing partner must rotate off of the audit every 5 years. However, in Malaysia, the MIA 
suggested 7 years to rotate the lead audit partner.  
 
The studies of on auditor tenure could not separated from the auditor switching studies. 
Many studies found that financially distressed firms were more likely to switch auditors than non 
distressed companies due to the reason that these types of companies need to hire a new quality of 
auditor compared to the previous one (Krishnan, 1994; and Krishnan and Stephens, 1995). 
Sinason et al. (2001) found that auditor tenure is longer for clients who received unqualified or 
unqualified-modified opinions. Interestingly, Hashanah (1998) found in Malaysia such behaviour 
is less apparent using data from 1975-1995. In one extreme case, the auditor was not even 
replaced after issuing five consecutive times of a disclaimer opinion to a client. But, the results 
statistically equivalent, meaning that no evidence exists to indicate that auditor tenure is longer 
for clients with unqualified opinions.  
 
Figure 1 shows relevant studies that have used the audit tenure variable in relation to 
auditors’ reporting. It seems that audit tenure variable in empirical study is still new though 
debates on audit tenure have gone through times and tides for four decades. Results are 
inconclusive like many other researches in auditing and thus prompting for a need of a new study 
in a new environment especially in new emerging markets like Malaysia.  
 
Figure 1: Studies on audit tenure to auditor reporting 
 
Studies Measurement of  
audit tenure 
Country Sample Audit tenure to 
auditor  
reporting 
Geiger & Raghunandan 
(2002) 
Natural log of 
number of years  
U.S. 117 stressed & bankrupt 
companies  
Positive 
Anandarajan, La Salle & 
Anandarajan (2001) 
Dichotomous value, 
1 for audit tenure of 
three years or less & 
0 otherwise 
U.S. 
 
Two partition of 216 for 
financial service & 307  
from non-financial  
service industry 
Negative 
Vanstraelen (2000) Number of years Belgium 146 match sample of  
stressed & non-stressed  
non-bankrupt companies 
Negative 
Louwers (1998) Number of years U.S. 
 
808 stressed non- 
bankrupt companies 
Not significant 
 
Similarly, Krishnan (1994); and Krishnan and Stephens (1995) found that switching 
companies were no more likely to have their modified report removed than were similar 
companies that did not switch auditors. Therefore, it is argued that if the financially distressed 
firms still maintain the same auditors and by the same time, if an unqualified report is issued, it 
may be perceived that the auditors’ independence is impaired. In addition, studies by Teoh and 
Lim (1996) found that retention of auditors for over five years would influence and impair audit 
independence.  
 
It is argued that the longer the auditors audit their clients the larger that lead to such close 
relationship between audit firms and clients and thus would inhibit auditors power in audit 
conflicts i.e. going concern issues. Study by Deis & Giroux (1992), O’Keefe et al. (1994) and 
Raghunandan et al. (1994) found that longer auditor tenure would decrease audit quality. 
Vanstraelen (2000) studied the effect of auditor tenure to auditor giving clean opinion and found 
negative effect of this relationship and thus provides supports for mandatory rotation. In addition, 
Anandarajan, La Salle and Anandarajan (2001) found evidence that short auditor tenure increases 
the likelihood of receiving a disclaimer going concern opinion. Longer tenure auditors are likely 
to only modify the opinion of an audit report when the issue of going concern is at stakes which is 
less conservative. In an experimental setting, Dopuch, King, & Schwartz (2001) found that 
auditors are less likely to impose a biased report if rotation is required, however, it also increases 
the magnitude of investment to improve financial reporting quality.  
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In contrast, Petty & Cuganesan (1996) argued that when mandatory auditor rotation is 
regulated, clients might be forced to accept a lower quality of service from an auditor who is a 
generalist, especially if fewer auditors invest in specialised industries such as banking, insurance 
or natural resources. Moreover, studies by Louwers (1998) and Johnson et al. (2002) found no 
evidence of reduced financial quality for longer audit firm’s tenures. Recently, Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2002) studied a sample of 117 bankrupt companies and suggested that auditors may 
be more influenced by their newly obtained clients in the earlier years of the engagement. Thus, 
audit independence issue or audit competence issue is at stake in early years of engagement and 
not in later years and would result in lesser going concern opinion to be issued by short time 
auditors. 
 
IV. HYPOTHESES  
 
Overall, prior researches suggested that there should not be any hard and fast rules on 
mandatory audit firm rotation. In U.S. many auditors have served their clients for more than 
twenty years (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002) and some since listed in the stock exchange. In such 
cases, auditors would be under greater pressure from clients and thus would unlikely issue a going 
concern opinion. However, auditors may be argued to have in-depth knowledge and thus would 
be able to defend themselves if such difficult situation arise and thus would be able to advise their 
clients if going concern assumption is no longer appropriate. Therefore, the derived hypothesis as 
follows (in null form):  
 
H01a: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between audit firm tenure and 
the issuance of going concern opinion  
 
H01b: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between companies, which 
never change their auditors since listing in Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
and the issuance of going concern opinion  
 
De Angelo (1981b) theorized that bigger audit firms have superior audit quality since they 
invest more in audit technology and training. Thus, in term of audit competence, it could be 
argued that larger audit firm would be able to detect problems regarding going-concern 
assumption more accurately than smaller audit firms. In term of audit independence, larger audit 
firms have more spreads of clients base when auditing listed companies than smaller audit firms 
(See Atef & Ayoib, 2000) and thus have less dependence on particular client. Anandarajan et al. 
(2001) however, found no evidence of auditor size effect on auditor going concern reporting. 
Such finding warrant a further study, perhaps in Malaysia, since the public perceive differences 
exist in many aspects of auditing between bigger firms and smaller firms including going concern 
assumption and not tested in Atef et al. (2002). Hence, we propose second hypothesis in null 
form,      
 
H02: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between auditor size and the 
issuance of going concern opinion  
 
Audit committee has been made mandatory in Malaysia since 19931. It is more likely that 
interaction between audit committee with external auditors may influence auditor’s choice of 
issuing going-concern2
                                                          
1 Beginning 31 August 1993, companies seeking listing on KLSE are required to have audit committee 
under s15A of KLSE listing requirement.  
2 Among main functions of audit committee are reviewing audit planning and audit procedures and 
discussing audit findings and report (MIA recommended practice guide on Audit Committee & section 
344A KLSE listing requirements).  
. An independent audit committee could help mitigate such pressure by 
supporting the auditor in disputes with management (Knapp, 1987). Hence, we expect some 
characteristics of board of directors, especially non-executive directors, as public watchdog and 
audit committee will influence auditor’s choice in going-concern.  
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Knapp (1987) found that in audit disputes, audit committee members tended to support 
the auditors rather than the management. However, several other researches have provided the 
support for having more outside directors on audit committee (e.g. Cadbury Report, 1992; 
Carcello & Neal, 2000). Atef et al. (2000) found evidence that independent audit committee is 
associated with going concern opinion using the year 2000 data from KLSE.  
 
We argue that placing strategic executive directors on the committee may shadow a 
measurement of independence of audit committee by proportion of outside directors. We believe 
that a higher independence of audit committee, which is measured by non-existence of powerful 
directors especially the managing director and executive directors (see also Carcello & Neal, 
2000) would lend better support for auditors.  
 
Hence, we propose third hypothesis in null form,  
 
H03: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between whole outsiders audit 
committee and the issuance of going concern opinion  
 
V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION  
 
Sample and Data  
 
The sample comprises all non-finance distressed companies identified using a list of financial 
indicators under ISA 570 (revised) Going Concern. The year of 2002 is selected since the ISA 
570 (revised) is applicable from 1 January 2002. We found 187 companies, which fulfilled the 
distress characteristics.  
 
Explanations of the Model  
 
This study replicates the model from the previous established studies in going concern audit 
opinion (see for example, Louwers, 1998; and Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002).  
 
The research model (in logistic form) is as follows:  
GC = α + b1TENURE + b2 AUDITSWITCH + b3 BIGFIVE + b4 ACOMOUT + b5 ZFC + b6 
DEFAULT + b7 LOGASSETS + e  
 
The measurements of the variables are as follows:  
 
Dependent Variable Measurement  
GC   = 1 if auditor issued going-concern opinion, else 0  
 
Hypotheses Variables  
TENURE  = Audit firm tenure in number of years  
AUDITSWITCH = Dummy variable, 1 if client never change its auditor at least once  
  since listed in the KLSE, 0 otherwise  
BIGFIVE  = Dummy variable, 1 if the auditor is the Big Five firm, and else 0  
ACOMOUT = Dummy variable, 1 if the audit committee is comprised of all     
             non-executive directors, else 0  
 
Independent Variables Measurement  
ZFC   = Probability of bankruptcy calculated from Zmijewski  
                            Financial Condition (1984)  
DEFAULT = Dummy variable having a value of 1 if the company is in default, 
  else 0  
LOGASSETS  = Natural log of total assets of clients  
e    = Error term of residual  
α i    = constant (i = 0)  
b   = coefficients (i =1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 
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Variables Definition and Discussion  
 
Audit Tenure & Audit Switch  
 
Tenure is the hypothesis variable measured by the length of auditor tenure in years since 
the KLSE was established. Auditor tenure is measured by the length of years which auditors audit 
their clients (Louwers, 1998 and Vanstraelen, 2000). In the sensitivity analyses, we use 
logarithmic transformation to correct for non-normality in the distribution of the data (see Geiger 
& Raghunandan, 2002). Similarly, we argue that auditors are in greater pressures from clients 
especially if the auditors have served the clients since listing in the stock exchange for many 
years. Due to the mixed theories and empirical findings, we do not provide direction for this 
relationship.  
 
Big Five  
 
Audit quality appears to be a factor that may enhance auditors’ independence. It is  
argued that larger audits firms are of better quality than smaller one (De Angelo, 1981b). 
Therefore, they will more likely to report the details of financial statement without bias, correctly 
and independently. In addition, Palmrose (1988) found that the larger audit firms were less likely 
to be involved in audit-related litigation than the smaller one. Alternatively, Big Five firms have 
greater risk of losing reputation, which may motivate a more objective audit reporting decision.   .       
 
Audit Committees  
 
The role of audit committees is very important in influencing the audit opinion. Thus, 
independent audit committees will ensure that the audit opinion really gives a picture the situation 
of that company. In addition, audit committee members are more likely to support an auditor 
involved in a major dispute especially on audit report with management when the client is in weak 
financial condition (Knapp, 1987). Atef et al. (2000) used the dichotomous value of audit 
committee with whole outsiders and found that such requirement is associated to higher 
probability of receiving going concern opinion.  
 
Probability of Bankruptcy  
 
Several studies found that a positively relationship between going concern opinion and 
probability of bankruptcy of a company. This is due to the fact that, the higher probability of 
bankruptcy, the higher the need of the auditors to issue going-concern opinion. Regardless of 
whatever bankruptcy model being employed in prior researches (see among others, Hopwood et 
al., 1989; Vanstraelen, 2000) in going concern opinion, the results suggest that auditors do assess 
distress condition of their clients. Prior research in Malaysia by Atef et al. (2002) used Zmijewski 
Financial Condition (ZFC) as suggested by Zmijewski (1984) and they found significant result. 
Similarly, we employ ZFC to measure financial distress of the companies. Kleinman & 
Anandarajan (1999) suggested that a score, which exceed 0.28, is considered as financial distress. 
Therefore, there is a positive association between probability of bankruptcy and going concern 
audit report.  
 
Default  
 
In this present study, a company is classified a default company if the company is either 
in payment default or technical default or has breached loan covenants. Therefore, we employ 
dichotomous variable as suggested by Chen & Church (1992). Going concern is associated with 
default status as found in Atef et al. (2002). They argued that default status would send strong bad 
signal that potential and successful negotiation with banks or other creditors would be unlikely. In 
the absence of such supports, companies under financial distress would hardly stay as going-
concern in future accounting period. Thus, there is a positive association between default status 
and type of going-concern report.  
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Client Size  
 
Total assets is used in the present study due to the amount of assets, which are more 
consistent before the 1997 crisis and thereafter compared to those of revenues. However, Atef et 
al. (2002) found no evidence that size of clients measured by total assets has association with the 
type of going concern audit report. Other measurements of client size include market 
capitalization and a mixture of sales and assets. It is transformed to logarithmic data to control for 
non-normality. Consistent with the previous research, a negative relationship between this 
independent variable and going concern opinion will take place (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002).  
 
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
 
Descriptive Results  
 
From 187 companies, Arthur Andersen (AA) and Ernst Young (EY) audited 42.17% of 
distressed companies. Since the merger of these two former Big Five firms in July 2002, almost 
half of these troubled account or the lion’s share lies with this new EY. All Big Five accounts 
70.28% of the KLSE troubled firms. This figure is comparable with their total shares of the KLSE 
companies (See Atef and Ayoib, 2000). 77.5% or 145 on these companies received going concern 
audit opinion. Thus many problems and critics would lie in the case of non-receiving going 
concern opinion.  
 
T-test in the following Table 1 confirms this preliminary finding that Big Five is different 
than non-Big Five in term of audit opinion and tenure. Big Five generally have longer audit tenure 
and issued a slightly more going concern opinion than non-Big Five. However, this is only a 
univariate test-result, which needs to be interpreted with caution. To test for our hypothesis, a 
model that combines multiple variables such as regression procedure would unveil whether such 
relationship holds true in a multivariate analysis.  
 
Table 1: t-test of B5 and non-B5 
Variables B5 (means) Non B5 (means) t-value Sig. 
TENURE  
(in years)  
10.5 7.26 2.820 0.005* 
GOING CONCERN  0.82 0.70 1.863 0.064* 
ACOMOUT 0.33 0.26 0.910 0.364 
DEFAULT 0.66 0.61 0.657 0.512 
ZFC 15.63 22.99 -0.805 0.422 
AUDITSWITCH 0.44 0.41 0.388 0.698 
TASSETS (RM)  679,922,418 471,684,583 0.767 0.444 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
  GC TENURE AUDIT 
SWITCH 
BIGFIVE ACOM 
OUT 
ZFC DEFAULT TASSETS 
GC Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .229(**) -.098 .128 .154(*) .171(*) .647(**) .003 
TENURE Pearson 
Correlation 
.229(**) 1 .266(**) .201(**) .122 -.033 .249(**) .085 
AUDIT 
SWITCH 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.098 .266(**) 1 -.033 -.031 .034 -.055 -.210(**) 
BIGFIVE Pearson 
Correlation 
.128 .201(**) -.033 1 .039 -.060 .043 .055 
ACOMOUT Pearson 
Correlation 
.154(*) .122 -.031   .039 1 .154(*) .114 .039 
ZFC Pearson 
Correlation 
.171(*) -.033 .034 -.060 .154(*) 1 .199(**) -.101 
DEFAULT Pearson 
Correlation 
.647(**) .249(**) -.055 .043 .114 .199(**) 1 -.055 
TASSETS   Pearson 
Correlation 
.003 .085 -.210(**) .055 .039 -.101 -.055   1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) figures are closed to unitary and thus conclude that 
multicollinearity3
Multivariate Regression  
 poses minimal threat to further regression analysis. In addition, further 
inspections on the condition index proves prior VIF test. Correlation matrix as in Table 2 between 
independent variables shows that multicollinearity is minimal. The highest is only 0.266 between 
TENURE and AUDITSWITCH at 0.01 significant levels.  
 
Going concern opinion has strong and significant correlation with audit tenure (r = 
0.229), default status (r = 0.647), outside audit committee (r = 0.154) and probability of bankruptcy 
(r = 0.171). In contrast, correlation analysis did not find significant relationship between Big 
Five/non Big Five effect on going concern opinion as found in t-test. Likewise in prior t-test 
analysis, univariate results should be read with caution and act as a complement to multivariate 
analysis of logistic regression in this study.  
 
 
We found similar results as in Geiger & Raghunandan (2002). Logistic regression results 
as in Table 3 shows that audit firm’s tenure and audit switching variables have statistically 
significant relationship (at-two-tailed) with the occurrence of going concern opinion. Hence, H01a 
and H01b are rejected. This means that the longer an audit firm has audited a client the higher is 
the probability of issuing going concern opinion unlike the frequent arguments of negative audit 
tenure effects made by public and business community alike. However, our finding also pointed 
out that if a client never changes its auditors then the possibility of receiving clean opinion is 
higher. Issue a going concern opinion.  
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression, n =187 
Variables Predicted 
Sign 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
TENURE ? .169 .097 3.012 .083 1.184 
AUDITSWITCH ? -1.094 .660 2.749 .097 .335 
BIGFIVE + .629 .653 .928 .335 1.877 
ACOMOUT + .319 .696 .210 .647 1.375 
ZFC + .606 .203 8.953 .003 1.833 
DEFAULT + 3.367 .820 16.851 .000 28.991 
LOGASSETS   - -.016 .491 .001 .975 .984 
Constant +/- -1.287  4.071 .100 .752 .276 
a Variable(s) entered on step 1: TENURE, AUDITSWITCH, BIGFIVE, ACOMOUT, ZFC, DEFAULT, LOGASSET.                                  
 
Cox & Snell R2= 0.464, Nagelkerke R2= 0.714, Hosmer & Lemeshow = 0.947  
 
Moreover, we found no evidence to reject H02 (auditor size) unlike in Behn et al., (2001) 
and H03 (audit committee). Thus, conclude that audit firm size as surrogated by Big Five and  
non-Big Five dichotomous classifications and audit committee independence have no significant 
influence over auditor reporting decision. Mutchler et al. (1997) found similar finding that auditor 
size has no significant effect on going concern decision though they did not provide any 
explanation. Thus, argument of perceived high quality by De Angelo (1981b) is not apparent as 
generally supported in the case of audit fees research. It is quite possible that a better approach is 
not to use a dichotomous value in audit reporting studies (as a proxy of audit quality) unlike in 
audit fees studies where the perceived difference of audit quality can be captured by using 
dichotomous value of Big Five and non Big Five. 
 
 In our sample, 77.55% are companies, which have audit tenure of five years or more. We 
then conducted sensitivity analyses using a dichotomous value of tenure of more than three years, 
more than five years and found those results still holds. Thus, the call for mandatory audit rotation 
may not yield what it hopes for. We would say our results do not support auditor rotation and thus  
 
                                                          
3 VIF ranges from 1.0408 to 1.441  
                                                                                                                         Parallel Session II (B) 
315 
 
change of auditor should be made of necessary and reasonable grounds such as in the event of 
non-performance of auditors or change of substantial and controlling shareholders and others.      .   
  
Using data sets of 2002, the results still support findings of prior study by Atef et al. 
(2002) related to debt-default status and serious financial distress variable. They used data in the 
year 2000. Both variables are strong determinants of auditor’s decision in issuing going concern 
in Malaysia. These findings also contribute to high pseudo R2 but it is still comparable with prior 
researches (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002 had pseudo R2 0.33, Louwers, 1998 had pseudo R2 
0.44). In addition, assets of the companies are proved to be insignificant factor in going concern 
issues unlike in many of audit fees studies. There are several explanations to this finding. Firstly, 
the auditor may investigate the quality of the assets and not just “any assets”. It is quite possible, 
if the distressed company has significant portion of assets, which have higher market value and 
demand such as investment in listed shares or has properties of high value would then helps the 
company to survive much better than others. Thus auditor may not issue a going concern opinion 
to such companies. Secondly, an alternative proxy for size in the case of going concern opinion 
such as revenue or turnover of the companies may yield better results.  
 
Table 4: Classification table 
 
Classification Tablea 
  Model's predicted opinion 
    
 
Auditor's Actual Opinion 
 
Standard 
 
Going Concern 
Percentage 
Correct 
 Standard 32   9 78.0 
      Going Concern 12 134 91.8 
    Overall Percentage  37.5% 6.7% 88.8  
     
a. The cut value is .500  
 
 As in Table 4, model shows minimal change in term of accuracy from Atef et al. (2002). 
The model has high prediction power of 88.8%. Type II (6.7%) is lower than type I (37.5%) error, 
which shows that it is not a serious problem. Type II error leads to auditors to give a clean opinion 
whereby they should give a going concern opinion. Thus we can say that most of distressed 
companies in Malaysia received “warning” from their auditor regarding its going concern 
assumption.  
 
Interestingly, it seems that in Malaysia, auditors are a little bit skeptical or very 
conservative on going concern assumption made by directors and thus they made low type II error 
and a bit too high type I error. High type I error may lead to self-fulfilling theory which suggest 
that their clients may face difficulties in obtaining credit or financing facilities from bankers or 
investors. These factors, the auditors do take to the account in their audit opinion when issue 
going concern opinion. Such events would pose higher cost to the auditors i.e. clients switch their 
auditors but Hashanah (1998) found that going concern opinion alone would not precipitate such 
effect. Future research on value relevance of going concern audit opinion may unveil this effect.  .  
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Mandatory audit rotation debates came from the arguments that long audit tenure would 
create cozy relationship between auditors and clients and thus would lead to audit failure such as 
in the case of bankruptcy. We found no market wide evidence to support that argument in 
Malaysia but instead we found that longer audit tenure has positive significant association with 
auditor’s reporting decision. In addition, we found that auditors in Malaysia made less serious 
error (type II) or audit failure compared to our model i.e. give clean opinion for clients who 
should be given going concern opinion when issuing going concern opinion. However, we did not  
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test on other type of audit failure such as qualified opinion of non-going concern issues. In this 
study, we did not discriminate the different types of going concern opinion including modified 
opinion, qualified opinion or disclaimer opinion as stated in ISA 570 (revised 2000).  
 
Our findings also pointed that if a client never changed its auditor since listing, there is a 
tendency to issue a clean opinion though the client suffers apparent financial problems. All in all, 
it simply read, “auditor change would do well, but forcing an unrealistic auditor rotation might 
not yield what it hopes for”. Therefore, for the benefit of the auditing profession, we echo the 
importance of self-regulation and Laissez-faire practice in Malaysia as a better alternative than a 
mandatory auditor rotation. Perhaps current national undertakings by regulators such as 
strengthening audit committee in term of independence and competence, and the proposal for a 
peer audit review process by the MIA would inhibit unethical audit process in Malaysia.  
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